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Abstract—Prior studies reveal that conflicts among Non 
Functional Requirements (NFRs) are not always absolute. 
They can also be relative depending on the context of the 
system being developed. Given that existing techniques to 
manage the NFRs conflicts are mainly focused on cataloguing 
the interrelationships among various types of NFRs, hence a 
technique to manage the NFRs conflicts with respect to NFRs 
relative characteristic is needed. This paper presents a novel 
framework to manage the conflicts among NFRs with respect 
to NFRs relative characteristic. By applying an experimental 
approach, the quantitative evidence of NFRs conflicts will be 
obtained and modeled. NFRs metrics and measures will be 
used in the experiments as parameters to generate the 
quantitative evidence. This evidence can then allow developers 
to identify and reason about the NFRs conflicts. We also 
provide an example of how this framework could be applied. 
Keywords–non-functional requirements, conflict, relative,    
identification, characterization, analysis, management, 
framework, experiment. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is widely acknowledge in the literature that 
the correct implementation of Non-Functional 
Requirements is recognized as a critical factor to 
the success of software projects. NFRs address the 
essential issue of software quality [1-3]; and they 
are also considered as the qualifications of the 
operations [4, 5]. However, although NFRs have 
been a focus of attention by researchers and 
practitioners alike for almost three decades, studies 
to date indicate that there is not enough progress 
made in dealing with NFRs compared to 
Functional Requirements (FRs). Managing NFRs 
is still difficult to perform due to the fact that most 
software developers do not have adequate 
knowledge about NFRs and little help is available 
in the literature [6]. Capturing, specifying, and 
managing NFRs are still difficult to perform and 
NFRs are often poorly articulated in the software 
requirements document [7, 8].  
NFRs tend to interfere, conflict, and contradict 
with one another. Unlike FRs, this inevitable 
conflict arises as a result of inherent contradiction 
among various types of NFRs [1, 2]. Certain 
combinations of NFRs in the software systems 
may affect the inescapable trade offs [2, 9, 10]. 
Achieving a particular type of NFRs can prevent 
the achievement of the other type(s) of NFRs.  
Dealing with NFRs conflict is essential due to 
several reasons. Firstly, conflict among software 
requirements is inevitable [1, 12, 13]. Conflicting 
requirements are one of the three main problems in 
the software development in terms of the 
additional effort or mistakes attributed to them 
[13]. A study of two-year period multiple-project 
analysis conducted by Egyed & Boehm [14, 15] 
reports that between 40% and 60% of 
requirements involved are in conflict, and among 
them, NFRs involved the greatest conflict, which 
was nearly half of requirements conflict [16]. 
Lessons learnt from practices also confirm that 
one of the essential issues during NFRs 
specification is management of conflict among 
interacting NFRs [2]. Experience shows that most 
systems suffer from severe tradeoffs among the 
major groups of NFRs. In fact, conflict resolutions 
for handling NFRs conflicts often result in 
changing overall design guidelines, not by simply 
changing one module.  
 
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A number of techniques to manage conflict 
among NFRs have been discussed in the literature 
[11]. Majority of them provide documentation, 
catalogue, or list of potential conflict. These 
catalogues represent the interrelationships among 
various types of NFRs. Some examples are: the 
QARCC win-win approach [10, 17, 18], trace 
analyzer of the requirements traceability technique 
[19], and a technique that adopts a hierarchical 
constraint logic programming approach [20]. 
Apart from strength and weaknesses of each 
technique, NFRs can be viewed, interpreted, and 
evaluated differently by different people and 
different context within which the system is being 
developed. Consequently, the positive or negative 
relationships among NFRs are not always obvious. 
These relationships might change depending on 
the meaning of NFRs in the context of the system 
being developed. Due to this relative 
characteristic, cataloguing the NFRs relationships 
in order to represent the conflict among NFRs 
would inevitably produce disagreement. 
Identifying the NFRs conflict without 
understanding the meaning of NFRs in the system 
being developed may produce the erroneous 
conflict identification and analysis.  
Prior studies [11, 21-23] reveal that the 
relativity of NFRs conflict can be presented in 
three categories: absolute conflict (labeled as 
“X”); relative conflict (labeled as “*”); and never 
in conflict (labeled as “O”). As illustrated in 
Figure 1 nineteen pairs of NFRs in this catalogue 
have relative conflict, which means that they are 
not always in conflict because they are claimed to 
be in conflict in certain cases but not in conflict in 
others.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Catalogue of Conflicts among NFRs [21] 
 
 
Given the above context, we are motivated to 
perform a further investigation into the conflict 
among NFRs in general, in order to increase our 
understanding about how NFRs conflict with, and 
affect one another; and how this conflict might be 
managed. Our research question has been 
formulated as follow: 
 
“With respect to the NFRs relative 
characteristic, how can we create a framework 
that can assist developers to identify and 
characterize the conflict among NFRs?” 
 
A framework to characterize and analyze the 
relative conflict among NFRs is presented as the 
novel contribution of this paper. The framework 
utilizes an experimental-based approach as the 
foundation to characterize the conflict and to 
perform conflict decision analysis. NFRs metrics 
and measure are used as parameters to collect the 
quantitative evidence and to model the NFRs 
conflict relationships.  
 
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH FOR NFRS 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
In our previous work, we have proposed a 
preliminary framework to manage the relative 
conflict between two types of NFRs, which are 
security and usability requirements [24]. This 
framework focuses specifically on the application 
of ontology in managing the relative conflict 
between security and usability. By following the 
Helix-Spindle model for ontological engineering 
[25], an ontological model of the security-usability 
requirements conflict has been developed. This 
ontology shows when security and usability are in 
conflict, what the impacts of the conflict are, and 
what the relevant strategies to resolve this conflict 
are. Therefore this framework can be used as a 
basis to assist analysts in managing conflict 
between security and usability requirements.  
Inspired by this framework, in this paper we 
present the sureCM framework that is able: (1) to 
manage conflict among various types of NFRs; 
and (2) to provide quantitative reasoning about the 
NFRs conflict. We have adopted an experimental 
approach as the basis to attain the evidence to 
identify and characterize the conflict among 
NFRs. In this framework, NFRs are characterized 
as the associated system functionality and systems 
operationalizations, and NFRs metrics and 
measures are used as parameters to gather the 
quantitative evidence in the experiments. This 
empirical evidence will be used to perform 
conflict decision analysis. The sureCM 
Framework is depicted in Figure 2 and the main 
terminology used in the framework is presented in 
Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 – sureCM Terminology 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the sureCM Framework 
consists of one type of input: NFRs as written in 
software requirements documents; five-layer 
process: P1, P2, P3, P4, P5; and two types of 
output: nature of conflict and conflict decision. In 
the process model, the ontology and methods will 
be used as the basis to execute the five-layer 
process. The ontology consists of functionality; 
NFRs metrics and NFRs measures. The 
knowledge from this ontology will be used as the 
parameter to set up and run a series of 
experiments. Furthermore, two methods have been 
defined to manage the conflict: Method for 
Conflict Characterization and Method for Conflict 
Decision Analysis. Conflict characterization 
method will be used to characterize the conflict 
from the results of the experiments, while conflict 
decision analysis method will be used to identify 
the conflict decision based on the characterization 
defined. The relationship and interaction between 
these components is illustrated in Figure 3. 
As shown in Figure 3, two types of NFRs (e.g. 
security requirement and usability requirement) 
will be used as the input to the framework. Then 
the conflict management process begins with the 
case definition, which is identifying the associate 
functionality of the system, i.e. relevant features of 
a software system, and the operationalizations, i.e. 
a way of implementing the defined functionality. 
Functionality part of the ontology will be used to 
assist with the identification process of 
operationalizations.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 2 – sure CM Framework 
 
 
By utilizing the ontology of NFRs metrics and 
NFRs measures, the NFRs that come as the input 
to the framework will be analyzed to identify their 
meanings and their associate metrics and measures 
in the context of the system being developed. 
These metrics and measures will be used in the 
experiments to quantify the NFRs level/degree of 
satisficing1 in the system being developed. 
                                                 
1 Satisfice is the term first coined by Hebert Simon [26] 
As a result of P1: Define Case, and P2: Identify 
Metrics and Measures, four output will be 
generated: system functionality; associate 
operationalization; NFR1 metric and measure; 
NFR2 metric and measure. Those output that have 
been defined with respect to the context of the 
system being developed, will then be used as the 
input to the next process layer, P3: Setup and Run 
Experiments. The process P3, is dedicated to 
designing the suitable experiments to collect the 
numerical data by utilizing the outputs attained 
from process P2. In this process, each applicable 
operationalization will be quantified using the 
defined NFRs metric and measure. The result of 
this experiment is the NFR’s satisficing 
level/degree in the system. The results obtained 
from the experiments will then be analyzed by 
using Conflict Characterization Method. This 
method will be executed in the P4: Characterize 
Conflict process. In characterizing NFRs conflict, 
conflict characterization method begins by 
creating a two-dimensional conflict relationship 
graph based on the quantitative data obtained in 
P3. Each operationalization conducted in the 
experiments will be plotted based on its NFRs 
metrics scale. By plotting all of the defined 
operationalizations in P4, a conflict relationship 
characterization will be created.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 – sureCM Interaction 
 
 
Lastly, by applying Conflict Decision Analysis 
Method, developers should be able to analyze the 
output from previous process, P4, to identify the 
suitable conflict decision to assist with the 
development of strategy to deal with the conflict. 
This analysis will be conducted in the process P5: 
Conflict Decision Analysis process. The analysis 
conducted will then determine whether the 
identified conflict is strong, weak, or even if there 
is no conflict among these NFRs, and decision 
about this severity of conflict is based on the shape 
of the graph plotted in process P4. 
We now present an example of the application 
of our approach in managing NFRs conflict. 
IV. APPLYING THE APPROACH 
Consider the following two NFRs given in a 
Software Requirements Specification document: 
 
NFR 1: The Chemical Tracking System shall have 
identified/authenticated the user and protect user’s 
personal information. 
 
NFR 2: A chemist who has never used the system 
before shall be able to learn using the system 
easily and independently. 
 
NFR1 and NFR2 will be used as the inputs and 
the associate functionality and their 
operationalizations are defined in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Functionality and Operationalizations 
 
NFR1 represents a security requirement and 
NFR2 a usability requirement. Previously defined 
ontology for security and usability metrics and 
measure are then utilized to identify the suitable 
metrics and measures for these requirements 
within the given context, as shown in Table 3. 
By using the parameters generated from 
previous processes (as shown in Table 4), a series 
of experiments to measure the security and 
usability level of each operationalization were 
conducted. In the experiment, first step was 
identifying the potential instruments for each 
operationalization. For example, pincode used to 
get access in the Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM) or smartphone can be used as the 
instrument for Fixed Key operationalization, or 
scrambled pincode device can be used for 
Scrambled Key operationalization. By applying 
the measuring method of chosen NFRs metrics 
and measures; the quantitative security and 
usability level can be obtained. In this example, 
the length of pincode fixed-digit was considered as 
the representation of security measure frequency 
of review. The length of time (in seconds) needed 
by the user to learn to use the function correctly 
was used to measure the system usability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Metric and Measures Identification 
  
 
Table 4 – Parameter for the Experiments 
 
For each operationalization, the quantitative 
data obtained from the experiments is recorded 
and presented in Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table 5 – sureCM Experimental Results 
 
By using the experimental results in Table 5 
and by applying Conflict Characterization Method 
of sureCM Framework, we then plot the conflict 
relationship between security and usability 
requirements as depicted in Figure 5. 
Finally, by applying the Conflict Decision 
Analysis Method from sureCM Framework, 
practitioners should be able to analyze the nature 
of conflict to decide what levels of security and 
usability can be tolerated in the system. According 
to Figure 5, as the conflict relationship graph 
shows a non-linear function, there is an obvious 
conflict between security (privacy metric) and 
usability (ease of function learning metric). Also, 
as there is no clear optimum solution/s existing in 
the diagram, i.e. maximum security and maximum 
usability, this means that the existing conflict is a 
strong conflict, and the developer must choose the 
satisficing-solution for finding the right balance of 
attributes satisfaction. Conflict relationship graph 
can be a linear graph or a non-linear one. As long 
as there is a tradeoff in that graph, it means there is 
a conflict there. 
 
Figure 5 – Nature of Conflict 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper describes a novel framework to 
identify and manage the relative conflict among 
NFRs. The framework utilizes an experimental-
based approach as the foundation to characterize 
and analyze the conflict. NFRs metrics and 
measure are used as parameters to gather the 
quantitative evidence of NFRs conflict 
relationship. This evidence is used as the basis to 
characterize the conflict and to perform conflict 
decision analysis. An example  that shows how the 
approach can be applied has also been presented.  
This framework assumes a pair wise NFRs 
conflict characterization and decision analysis. 
However, it can also be easily extended to be 
applied in situation where conflict exists among 
more than two NFRs. 
Although in this paper the conceptual model of 
the framework has been established; and a number 
of articles have also been published on 
investigating the notion of NFRs, the conflict 
among NFRs, the catalogue of conflict among 
NFRs with respect to NFRs relative characteristic 
and a preliminary framework on security and 
usability conflict [11, 21-24, 27, 28], however, 
several important tasks remain:  
1) empirical evaluation 
The framework will be empirically evaluated 
through controlled experiments and then followed 
by a series of industrial case studies. The reason 
for conducting controlled experiments is because: 
(a) “controlled experiments make it possible for 
the careful observation and precise manipulation 
of independent variables (e.g. proposed 
framework); (b) allowing for greater certainty; and 
(c) encourage the researcher to try out novel 
frameworks in a safe and exploratory environment 
before implementing them in the real world 
settings” [29]. Effectiveness and efficiency will be 
used as the evaluation criteria. Effectiveness 
means that this framework can be used to manage 
the NFRs conflict by considering NFRs relative 
characteristic, while efficiency represents how fast 
people can identify the conflict using the 
framework.  
2) tool support 
To support the framework utilization, we also 
plan to develop a semi-automatic tool that can 
assist software developers, particularly 
requirements engineers to perform conflict 
management among NFRs. 
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